

## Assessment of The Impacts of Government Revenue-Generating Agency on Anti-Smuggling Activities at the Borderlines in Southwestern Nigeria: A Case of Nigeria Custom Service

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### Abstract

This study examines the impacts of Nigeria Custom Service on anti-smuggling activities at the border communities in the Southwestern Nigeria. The study relies solely on primary data gathered from the sample of 384 questionnaires distributed in both Seme and Idi-iroko borders out of which 313 are returned successfully. In this study, the inhabitants of the border communities are purposively selected. Using logistic regression analysis, the study finds that, despite the revenue targets given by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to Nigeria Custom Service, the control of banditry and robbery has significant reducing impact on anti-smuggling activities ( $\beta = -1.4303$ ;  $P > |z| = 0.038$ ;) while that of control of human trafficking significantly aids the anti-smuggling activities ( $\beta = 1.87807$ ;  $P > |z| = 0.002$ ) in the Southwestern Nigeria. The study therefore, urges Nigerian Custom Service to avoid being complicit when controlling the banditry and robbery activities at the various borderlines while trying to meet the revenue targets of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN).

**Keywords:** Custom; anti-smuggling; regression; Nigeria

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### 1. Introduction

The need for the security of the borderlines is now of utmost importance in the world today due to increase in crimes and act of terrorism. This issue has started right from the end of the Cold War and the initial quest for globalization. The recent insecurity that has ravaged the Nigerian states has made the topic relevant and topical. Nigeria has its territorial boundaries covering the land space of 4,047km and 853km (453 nautical miles). The geographical entity was partitioned by the colonial powers at the Berlin Conference in 1884 (Onyekwelu, 2014). The international borders define the legal and jurisdictional limits of any nation-state. It could either be partially or fully controlled, perhaps at one designated checkpoint or more across the breadth and length of the country. Undoubtedly, border security and its management constitute main factors of concern in tackling security challenges in any country of the World, most especially on the issues of arms smuggling and act of terrorism (Ericson and Kevin, 2002).

In most countries of the world, either the developed or the developing countries, security has become a front burner issue. In the case of Nigeria, for example, the nature and characteristics of its border management with neighboring countries are poor demarcation and naming thereby making them porous. Nigeria, just like any other West African countries, has been battling with the cross-national crimes, which stand as major threat to both national and communal securities. This could be exemplified in drug trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, smuggling of contraband goods, illegal arms trafficking, among others. It is imperative to note that smuggling has become a central phenomenon. This is because it has constantly brought about the demand and supply of economic pull, in respect to what the clients demand, and their willingness to pay, plus the capability of the smuggler to deliver the supply request. The synergy and collaborative efforts by the government, the security personnel and the border communities remain questionable as border communities are still the domain and the first hosting for the entry of all kinds of smuggled items, transit-resting point and exit for smuggled arms.

The Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) as a part of the security agencies, came into existence nearly more than a century ago at a time the British Colonial Administration appointed Mr. T. A. Wall, in 1891, as the Director-General of Customs in charge of collecting Inland Revenue in the Niger Coast Protectorate (Oladimeji, 2017). The NCS is a paramilitary organisation that performs three major functions.

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Firstly, it involves in the act of collecting revenue crucial to the Nigerian government finances. Secondly, it enforces trade policy, manages difference in tariffs, and formulates the restrictions of quota, anti-dumping measures, and rules of origin, trade valuation, and goods/consignments embargoes. Thirdly, it performs security functions; by combating smuggling activities and, in alliance with other security agencies, bringing up border standards and driving out narcotics and illegal weapons (NCS, 2012).

Despite all measures put in place by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) through the establishment of both revenue generating and security agency like the NCS at the borderlines, arms smuggling, explosives, drugs as well as movement of terrorists across the nation's borders continued unabated (Dotty, 2006). It is against this backdrop that this study investigates the impact of the Nigeria Custom Service and anti-smuggling activities in Southwestern, Nigeria.

Specifically, existing studies, such as (Dotty, 2006; Opanike, 2015; Mobolaji and Alabi, 2017) among others, revealed that smuggling activities at borders, in a modern society, have been a major phenomenon distracting the continuous growth in relation between countries. This is because countries with varying levels of socio-economic, political, and cultural growths are merged in some kinds of regional structure and this has aided the facilitation of border criminal activities. Border crimes such as smuggling activities are usually perpetrated within regions or among nations that are usually linked with one another and this menaces have become intense that portends threats to border communities (Opanike, 2015).

In view of the threat of border crimes such as smuggling activities at border communities, generally the governments in countries of the world and specifically, as we have witnessed in Nigeria, in response to the insecurity challenges, established security architectures such as border security agencies to address the challenges of border insecurity and smuggling activities. The specific role of these security agencies is to stem the tide of border crimes and its infiltrating impact on the border communities. The cumbersome nature of the problem could be identified in the complexity of the border crimes, their penetrations as well as threats they pose to the border communities (Shelly, 1995).

Recently, Nigeria has emerged as a new hotspot for all forms of cross-border violence, from human trafficking to internet fraud and smuggling, among other things (Opanike, 2015). These actions have a tendency to wreak havoc on the security measures that have notably been put in place by the different security agencies. The porous border, for example, has made it easier for offenders to operate freely. Despite the presence of security agencies, smuggling activities at border are continuously rising in modern times and remain a major problem to the security condition of the country and border communities are the first recipients of such security bridge.

Border criminality arising from smuggling activities between Benin and Nigeria have remarkably increased since 2003, resulting in international robbery and related criminal activities threatening the security of lives in the affected communities and as such leading to multi-dimensional influence of border shut-downs on the Nigerian side (Sossou-Agbo, 2011). Particularly, along the Benin-Nigeria corridor, armed attacks and extortions at illegal check-points, as well as criminal activities are rampant and the border is also known for the smuggling of drugs, small arms, and light ammunition on their way to Nigeria or Ghana (Adeolu and Fayomi, 2012). Human trafficking is also rampant in West and Central Africa, with 200,000 children forced to work and trafficked from countries such as Burkina Faso, Togo, and Benin to Nigeria, Gabon, the Gulf States, and Europe, where they live and work in a slave-like manner (Addo, 2006).

The NCS is one of the several security agencies that is saddled with the responsibility of ensuring that country is stable economically and politically, while economic role is concerned with the economic wellbeing of the country, the political role is associated with the security of border communities and the sovereignty of any country (Adeniji, 2018). However, despite the presence of multiple NCS security outposts, the spate of smuggling activities at the border communities persists. Scholarly works on the security of border communities have devoted much attention to the effort and role of other security agencies such as Immigration, Federal Road Safety Corps, Army, and Navy which have been designated to various outpost at the borders with little or no emphasis on NCS activities (Mobolaji and Alabi, 2017). Hence, this study therefore, investigates the impact of NCS in anti-smuggling activities in Southwestern Nigeria. The remaining sections of the paper are as follows: section 2 discusses literature review; section 3 presents the methodology employed while the empirical analysis is contained in section 4. The study is wrapped up by section 5, which is concluding remark.

## 2. Literature Review

According to Buzan (1983), Nigeria has extensive land and maritime international borders of about 4,037km and 853kn (452nm) respectively. These boundaries were inherited without proper delineation or demarcation when the nation achieved independence.

The Nigerian border is notorious for its lack of protection and porousness. As a result, illicit activities such as the smuggling of weapons, ammunition, explosive devices, and money across Nigerian borders are permitted. Following that, these tools are used to commit acts of terrorism in Nigeria. The following are the Nigerian border crossing points:

- (i) Demarcation between Nigeria and Republic of Benin
- (ii) Demarcation between Nigeria and Cameroon
- (iii) Demarcation between Nigeria and Chad
- (iv) Demarcation between Nigeria and Niger Republic

Nigeria's main border countries, according to Osimen et al., (2017), are Cameroon (1,690 kilometers east), Niger (1,497 kilometers north), Benin (773 kilometers west), and Chad (773 kilometers west) (87 kilometers northeast). Since the bulk of these border areas are rugged and jungle-like, effective border surveillance is daunting (Mustapha, 2004). Hundreds of illicit roads link or lead to some of Nigeria's main borders with neighboring African countries. Nigeria has vast boundaries, with hundreds of footpaths connecting it to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, as well as Mali, Libya, and Sudan (Osimen et al., 2017).

Bunzan (1983) further states that available data indicate that Nigeria have around 1,475 "official" borders and 1,975 "unofficial" borders, having significant impacts on the nation's economy and security. Terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram, Nigeria's most prominent terrorist organization, have successfully exploited the weak management of these border points. In terms of terrorist activities, the group is known to have used the porous nature of Nigerian borders to import weapons, ammunitions, explosive devices, and money laundering to carry out acts of terrorism against Nigerians, primarily in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, and Kano states.

In a related trend, the vast number of arms and ammunition confiscated from rebel groups in the Niger Delta during the amnesty program shows that weapons were smuggled in through the country's lax border controls. The Nigerian border control issue necessitates a comprehensive investigation of entry point profiles and strategic functions. Thousands of Nigerians live in neighboring countries, and the percentage of Nigerians living in neighboring countries is important. Nigeria, on the other hand, has followed a policy of deporting "illegal aliens" back to their homeland, as well as the immediate closing and reopening of those borders, in the name of national security (Bunzan, 1983).

In the study of Osimen et al., (2017), according to a conservative estimation by locals, there are well over 250 footpaths connecting or leading directly to Cameroon, Chad, or Niger from the Damaturu/Maiduguri axis. Since security forces are largely unaware of these paths, they are unmanned and unprotected, and therefore serve as conduits for arms and ammunition trafficking into Nigeria. The "merchants of death" have devised new ways to defeat security forces at the border by using these unarmed footpaths, which is disheartening and heartbreaking. One of these methods is the use of camels, donkeys, and cows to carry arms, ammo, and drugs like cocaine into Nigeria. Since the arms are lightweight, compact, and collapsible, they can be conveniently concealed and carried in specially made skin or thatched bags intended for the illicit "expedition" in unforeseen, unsuspecting, and therefore undetected locations on camels and donkeys.

According to Sagir (2010), in the country's North-East sub-region, some cows and grain traders concoct ways to hide arms and ammunition in hollow fuel tankers, under vehicles' motors, and inside bags of grains, both of which go unnoticed by security forces at the affected border posts. The "grains" are shipped in vast numbers by trucks, trailers, Lorries, and oldstyle pickup vans and jeeps, and security officers pay no heed to them. Nigeria's informal cross-border trade, which includes trade with all of its neighbors, particularly Niger and Cameroon, is estimated to account for 20% of the country's GDP. To both of these countries, the openness of Nigeria's (illegal) economy is critical. Nigeria has taken advantage of this in the past by showing its power across border policies.

The Benin economy was in deep trouble in 2003, when ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo closed the border between Nigeria and the Benin Republic. Petrol is a major illegally imported product in Benin. Petrol is smuggled into Benin in large amounts because it is cheaper in Nigeria. For most members of the border nation, the contraband trade is a major source of revenue.

From the study of Afrika and Ajumbo (2012), in 2004, illegally imported gasoline satisfied 73% of the Benin demand and was cheaper than gasoline sold by state-owned stations. For other services such as agricultural products, the volume of informal cross-border trade between Nigeria and its neighbors is calculated to be ten times greater. Informal cross-border trading can be perceived as both a positive and negative phenomenon, depending on the reviewer's opinion. In the one side, it represents a long-standing friendship between citizens segregated by colonial borders.

Olapegba et al. (2012), mentioned the various natures of Nigeria's borders are one reason why attempts to regulate smuggling activities have been futile; no one knows how many routes there are. While the official/legal entry points have been established, observation has revealed that there are numerous other unmanned or poorly manned entry points (both land and sea).

Another explanation may be that the country borders a number of countries, including Benin Republic, Togo, Chad, and Cameroon. All of these countries share cultural bonds and affinities with Nigerians who live near their borders (for example, the Borgu Kingdom in Nigeria has cultural bounds with the Chadians; the Ketu Kingdom in Nigeria have similar cultural norms with the one in Benin Republic. Similarly, the Amazonia people of Nigeria share traditional traditions with the Cameroonians, as well as the Togolese and Yoruba people of Nigeria). People consider themselves as kin and kith as a result of these dynamic heritages, and therefore find no basis for any impediment to the free exchange of goods and services. Citizens view law enforcement officers as "victimizing" their "cousins," making their work difficult, and smuggling is actively promoted as a result.

Iwebi (2017), on the other hand, notes that arms smuggling has remained a phenomenal issue at the international, regional and national levels. A common point arising from various viewpoints on arms smuggling is that it involves a wide variety of firearms and the methods by which they are illegally forced into a state. For instance, The 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Arms Smuggling and Other Related Materials, which serves as the West African sub-regional benchmark for regulating arms and ammunition among member countries, defines arms as "destructive war weapons and ammunition," which also includes "firearms and other destructive war weapons or devices such as an exploding bomb, an incendiary bomb or a gas bomb, a grenade, a rocket launcher, a rocket launcher, a rocket launcher, Shotguns and carbines, machine guns, assault rifles, and light machine guns are among the weapons available.

According to Adeola and Oluyemi (2012), Nigeria has been trapped in numerous and multifaceted problems orchestrated by her exposure to the influx of smuggled arms into the country through her border posts. Eliagwu (2003) notes that there are recorded incidences of over fifty violent clashes and conflicts in Nigeria that left-over thousands of persons dead, too many injuries and many renders homeless. The increasing arms smuggling activity along the nation's borders portends a great danger with dire consequences on national and regional security as arms are unlawfully being possessed by unauthorised persons. Between 2007 and 2015, African countries invested over \$300 billion on weaponry, equaling the amount of foreign assistance provided to Africa during the same time span (YawKuome, 2016). As a result, an estimated 79 percent of these weaponry and ammunitions were smuggled into numerous countries around the world, with a large percentage of these weapons ending up in the hands of people in Africa (Ibrahim, 2003; Stohl and Tuttle, 2009; Nte, 2011; Yaw-Kuome, 2016, Iwebi 2017).

As Bundo (2014) rightly observes that arms are flowing into states regularly and illegally through her border posts. Worried by Asiwaju's (2015) view that arms smuggling has been traditionally overlooked, especially during the cold war era, efforts by the international community to curb arms smuggling and proliferation of weapons focused almost entirely on heavy conventional arms and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, collectively referred to as weapons of mass destruction. This is quite understandable, considering the fact that the impacts of these weapons in conflict situation have been evidently catastrophic.

According to Basu (2014), major investments in anti-smuggling efforts have been made in recent decades. For example, in the United States, government funding for combating illicit drug smuggling increased from USD219 million in 1981 to USD800 million in 1999, with the majority of the funds going to US Customs and Border Patrol and the Drug Enforcement Agency (US Office of National Drug Control Policy 2000). Customs and border patrol services on the southwest US-Mexico border were increased from 3,389 agents in 1993 to 7,231 agents in 1998 to stem the tide of illegal drug trafficking (US Department of Justice, 2004).

UNODC (2015) and Stephen (2016), concluded the introduction of drug trade in West Africa can be traced back to Nigeria. Nigeria is the world's most populated Black Country, with the largest population of criminals, who predominantly non-Nigerians are posing as Nigerians. The first arrest was made in 1983, and the death penalty for drug dealers was enforced during Gen. Buhari's presidency. This caused panic among neighbouring countries necessitating the push towards Ghana. According to Adetula (2015), Nigerian "drug pushers" have recently reported that their activities have extended outside Europe to reach several African nations. In Chad and Equatorial Guinea, several Nigerians allegedly engaged in drug dealing have been apprehended. As a result, some of these drug traffickers often enlist the help of others to carry out their activities, making it difficult for law enforcement to find them. These mule or couriers frequently go unnoticed when they walk through children, priests, pregnant women, and important people in society.

Nigeria's land boundaries, according to the majority of security officers polled, are open to a number of crimes. Surprisingly, the incidence of smuggling activities has not decreased considering the presence of various security operatives along border areas, including at least 19 checkpoints set up by Nigerian Customs, Immigration, the NDLEA, and the Police. For security forces in Nigeria's border regions and in West Africa, smuggling has become a major issue. The study of Brown (2013), maintained that international crime networks are targeting

West Africa as a new global hub for the trafficking, wholesale, and increasing cultivation of illicit drugs. Because of the fragmented nature of the border zone, security forces have a tough time keeping track of people and goods. The federal government has recently begun putting steps in place to reduce criminal smuggling. Smuggling takes many forms, ranging from the smuggling of food to the smuggling of cars and guns, among other things.

### **3. Methodology**

This section discusses the research methods for the study. It includes the study area, research design, administration of research instrument, sampling technique and sample size as well as technique of data analysis.

#### **3.1 Areas of Study**

This study is carried out in the Southwestern geopolitical region of Nigeria. The Southwest is selected to ease data collection for the study. The region is densely populated by the Yoruba speaking people; and located in the West African coastlines thereby having similar climatic condition, alternating dry and raining season. The region comprises six (6) States namely Ondo, Osun, Ekiti, Oyo, Ogun and Lagos, but only three (3) out of these States have border communities. The States with border communities are Lagos, Ogun and Oyo States. Both Lagos State and Ogun state are purposively selected for this study. Specifically, Badagry/Seme border community in Lagos State and Owode/Idi-roko border community in Ogun State are selected for the study because both are major recognised borderlines in terms of porosity for all kinds of smugglings.

The Seme border is a historic coastal town in Badagry that connects Nigeria and the Republic of Benin, and the border is as old as the country. The Nigerian-Benin border is actually the Seme/Krake border, contrary to popular belief that Seme was a Benin territory. Seme is located in Lagos State's Badagry Division and it is part of the Badagry-West Local Council Development District, which is affected by the State's current political division. The Kraka is also a coastal town in Benin that is regularly patrolled by Customs, police, and phytosanitary officials. The border area of Seme has been described as "significant channel for better regional integration within ECOWAS" (Uchenna, 2016). The Aworis, Ijaws, and Eguns are the majority of the people in the region, who are primarily farmers and fishermen.

On the other hand, Idiroko is a town in the Ipokia local government area of Ogun State, Nigeria. It is a recognised boundary that extends along the Nigeria-Benin border since the 1960s. The towns and villages that surround the town include Oke-Odan, Ilase, Ita Egbe, and Ajilete. As a result of the location of the official cross-border post and cross-border trading operations within the frontier cities, Idiroko has grown from a village to a city (Omoniyi, 2004). The people of Idiroko speak a variety of languages because of cross-cultural interaction and inter-marriages, (Adefaye, 2012). On the Lagos-Badagry-Porto Novo highway, Idiroko is a border town between Nigeria and Benin. On the West African coastal plain, the location is about 55 meters above sea level. The annual rainfall ranges from 1500 to 2000 millimeters. The weather pattern matches that of surrounding countries, with a rainy season from May to October (Omoniyi, 2004). Idiroko is located in the Ipokia local government area of Ogun State. It has Nigerian police, army, customs, and immigration administrative units posted because it is a border area. The Oba, the Oniko of Idiroko, is the traditional ruler of the region, who is assisted by a council of chiefs.

#### **3.2 Research Design**

The study employs the survey research design. The descriptive survey nature of the research uses data gathered from members of the selected groups in the communities within the bordered areas which include Landlord Association, Community Development Association (CDA) and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO). This allows the use of questionnaire to generate necessary data from the respondents. The questionnaire is structured in line with the general aim of examining the impacts of NCS on anti-smuggling activities at border communities in Southwestern Nigeria. Qualitative response model is employed for the purpose of this study.

#### **3.3 Research Instrument**

The questionnaire is the main research instrument used to collect data for this analysis. Closed-ended questions are included in the survey, which used a five-point Likert scale. The questionnaire is comprised of three

(3) parts or sections; with section “A” comprising items on demographic data such as age, sex, status, level of education, marital status, rank, and years of experience. Section “B” contains items on the perception of the role of NCS in the anti-smuggling activities at border communities in Southwestern Nigeria. Section “C” comprises of statements on the impact of NCS on the anti-smuggling activities at border communities in the study area.

### 3.4 Sampling Technique and Sample Size

The study employs non-probability sampling technique. Specifically, purposive sampling technique is adopted for this study. Lagos and Ogun states are purposively selected on the basis of specific characteristics or attributes they possess that are important to this study. Badagry/Seme border, Lagos State and Owode/Idiroko, Ogun State are selected for the study. The Raosoft sample size calculator is used to determine the sample size for the study which gives 384.

### 3.5 Technique of Data Analysis

The qualitative data collected for the analysis are analyzed using analytical methods that are suitable for the objective. The study utilizes the analytical methods such as percentages, and frequencies analyses. Logistic regression is employed to carry out to assess the effect of NCS on the anti-smuggling activities at border communities in the study area. This objective was achieved through the use of questionnaires that are administered. This study adopted logistic regression as specified in the following equation to analyse the data towards achieving this objective.

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 NCS_{i1} + \epsilon_i$$

Where:

$Y_i$  = captures anti-smuggling activities of border communities;

$NCS_{i1}$  = represents activities of NCS;

$\epsilon_i$  = error term; and

$Y_i = 1$ , if the border community is secured but  $Y_i = 0$ , if otherwise.

## 4. Empirical Analysis

This chapter deals with the presentation, analysis, and interpretation of the qualitative data collected. The qualitative data are derived from the responses of the respondents to the administered questionnaire in the Badagry/Seme border community in Lagos State and Owode/Idi-roko border community in Ogun State. A total number of Three Hundred and Eighty-Four (384) copies of the questionnaire are administered in order to elicit information on the Nigeria Customs Service and anti-smuggling activities at both selected border communities in the Southwestern Nigeria out of which Three hundred and Thirteen (313) copies of the questionnaire are retrieved from the field, thus representing 81.51% of the total copies of the questionnaire administered. The socio-demographic data are fittingly presented in frequency and percentage, while the other parts captured the results and interpretation of the logistic regression analysis.

### 4.1 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

The socio-demographic attributes of the respondents are summarily presented in this section. Such attributes include age, highest educational qualification, marital status, rank, department/unit, and years of experience. These bio-data are considered so as to enhance the reliability of the data generated for this study. The Table 1 shows that 2 (0.64%) of the respondents are less than 20 years, 88 (28.11%) of the respondents fall within the age range of 21-30 years, 155 (49.52%) of the respondents are within age range of 31-40 years, 56 (17.89%) of the respondents are within age range of 41-50 years, 10 (3.19%) of the respondents are in the age range 51-60 years and only 2 (0.64%) gave no response. This indicates that over 95% of the respondents are considerably matured, and at their adulthood age of 21 and above years; so as to give required information on Nigeria Customs Service and anti-smuggling activities at border communities in Southwestern Nigeria as well as reliable responses for this study.

The Table (1) shows that 36 (11.50%) of the respondents have put in a total of below 5 years in service, 173 (55.27%) have also spent in a total of between 5-10 years in service which is in majority, 65 (20.76%) spent between 11-15 years in service, 22 (7.03%) have engaged in their respective services between 16-20 years, 2 (0.64%) engaged in the service between 20 years and above years and 15 (4.79%) gave no response. This distribution shown that majority of the respondents have relatively required years of service and exposure for providing basic and accurate answers to the research questions. This, therefore, makes the findings of the research to be insightful, detailed and decisive.

In addition, the Table (1) also presents that 37 (11.82%) of the respondents are senior staff, 268 (85.62) are junior staff, 4 (1.28%) are management staff and only 4 (1.28%) gave no response. These selective respondents are knowledgeable and at vantage positions to provide needed information on the Nigeria Customs Service and its anti-smuggling activities at border communities. Thus, this section engenders the validity and reliability of the findings of this study.

**Table 1: Socio-demographic Characteristics**

<b>CHARACTERISTICS</b>	<b>FREQUENCY</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE</b>
<b>Age (years)</b>		
<20	2	0.64
21-30	88	28.11
31-40	155	49.52
41-50	56	17.89
51-60	10	3.19
No response	2	0.64
<b>Total</b>	313	100.0
<b>Gender</b>		
Male	265	84.66
Female	40	12.77
No response	8	2.55
<b>Total</b>	313	100.0
<b>Marital Status</b>		
Single	37	11.82
Married	268	85.62
Divorced	4	1.28
No response	4	1.28
<b>Total</b>	313	100.0
<b>Religion</b>		
Islam	258	82.42
Christianity	51	16.29
Africa traditional	2	0.64
No response	2	0.64
<b>Total</b>	313	100.0
<b>Highest Educational Qualification</b>		
Primary School Certificate	13	4.15
Secondary School Education	136	43.45
Technical	21	6.71
National Diploma	101	32.27
B.Sc./HND	31	9.90
Masters	9	2.88
No response	2	0.64
<b>Total</b>	814	100.0
<b>Nature of job</b>		
Government	158	50.47
Private	101	32.27
NGO	52	16.61
No response	2	0.64
<b>Total</b>	313	100.0
<b>Working experience</b>		
<5 years	36	11.50
5 - 10 years	173	55.27
11- 15 years	65	20.76
16 - 20 years	22	7.03
20 years and above	2	0.64
No response	15	4.79
<b>Total</b>	313	100.0

<b>Rank</b>		
Senior Staff	37	11.82
Junior Staff	268	85.62
Management	4	1.28
No response	4	1.28
<b>Total</b>	<b>313</b>	<b>100.0</b>

In an attempt to analyse the impacts of NCS on the anti-smuggling activities at border communities in Southwestern Nigeria, respondents are asked through questionnaires to rate the impacts NCS have had in border communities in the Southwestern Nigeria. The assertion’s values or responses areorganised using a Likert scale of measurement, such as Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D) and Strongly Disagree (SD). In addition, logistic regression is employed as a mode of analysis.

The Table (2) reveals the result of logit model. The dependent variable for logit model analysis is anti-smuggling activity ( $Y_i$ ). The probability of obtaining the chi-square statistic given that the null hypothesis is true is given as  $Prob > \chi^2$ . This is the probability of obtaining chi-square statistic (24.54) in logit analysis as presented in Table (2). It is otherwise known as p-value. The p-values for logit analysis (0.0019) generally measured the joint effect of independent variables on dependent variable( $Y_i$ ). It measures the overall significant of the model. Since the p-value is less than 0.05 critical values then the model is said to be statistically significant at 5%. The pseudo R-square is relatively low however; this regression analysis does not have an equivalent to R-Square that is found in Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. The result shows that control of insecurity associated with banditry and robbery in the bother community ( $NC6_i$ ) has statistically significant negative effect on anti-smuggling activities of NCS in the selected border areas; i.e. it is ineffective in controlling smuggling activities at the border communities. Specifically, for every 1 unit increase in the control of insecurity associated with banditry at the border community ( $NC6_i$ ); it would lead to  $-1.430305$  reduction in the anti-smuggling activity of NCS. While the control of human trafficking ( $NC8_i$ ) have statistically significant and positive effect on the anti-smuggling activities of the NCS at 5% level; i.e. effective in controlling smuggling activities. That is, for every 1 unit increase in the control of smuggling activities associated with human trafficking ( $NC8_i$ ) would lead to 1.878073 improvement in the anti-smuggling activities at the border community,  $NC1_i, NC2_i, NC3_i, NC4_i, NC5_i, NC7_i$  are statistically insignificant and therefore, theoretically not different from zero.

**Table 2: Logit Regression Results**

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. logit y nc1 nc2 nc3 nc4 nc5 nc6 nc7 nc8

Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -272.74024
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -260.55275
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -260.47046
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -260.4704
Iteration 4:  log likelihood = -260.4704

Logistic regression              Number of obs   =          407
                                LR chi2(8)      =          24.54
                                Prob > chi2     =          0.0019
Log likelihood = -260.4704      Pseudo R2      =          0.0450
    
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y	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
nc1	-.1488386	.6198583	-0.24	0.810	-1.363738 1.066061
nc2	.2953556	.4226056	0.70	0.485	-.5329362 1.123647
nc3	.2347948	.5548443	0.42	0.672	-.85268 1.32227
nc4	.0353728	.4835703	0.07	0.942	-.9124075 .9831532
nc5	-.1891662	.2104347	-0.90	0.369	-.6016106 .2232782
nc6	-1.430305	.6882063	-2.08	0.038	-2.779165 -.0814455
nc7	.800718	.492121	1.63	0.104	-.1638214 1.765257
nc8	1.878073	.5978617	3.14	0.002	.7062857 3.049861
_cons	-.972826	.6753248	-1.44	0.150	-2.296438 .3507863

Where:

Y: anti-smuggling activities along border communities

NC1: control of violence at the border communities

NC2: reduction of illegal use of arms and ammunitions in the border communities

NC3: control of possession of contrabands in the border communities

NC4: control of possession of hard drugs in the border communities

NC5: control of illegal migration in the border communities

NC6: control of banditry and robbery in the border communities

NC7: control of money laundering in the border communities

NC8: control of human trafficking in the border communities

Variables are in log-odd units. Similar to Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression, the prediction equation is as follow:

$$\text{Log}(p/1-p) = b_0 + b_1NC1_i + b_2NC2_i + b_3NC3_i + b_4NC4_i + b_5NC5_i + b_6NC6_i + b_7NC7_i + b_8NC8_i + e_i \dots\dots\dots(2)$$

$$\text{Log}(p/1-p) = -0.9728 - 0.1488nc1 + 0.2953nc2 + 0.2347nc3 + 0.0353nc4 - 0.1891nc5 - 1.4303nc6 + 0.8007nc7 + 1.8780nc8 \dots\dots\dots(3)$$

Equations (2) and (3) tell us about the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables, where the dependent variable ( $Y_i$ ) is on the logit scale. These estimates measure the amount of increase in the predicted log odds of ( $Y_i$ ) = 1 that would be predicted by a unit increase of the predictor, holding all other predictors constant.

**5. Conclusion**

This study examines the impacts of NCS on the anti-smuggling activities in the Southwestern Nigeria. The study employs qualitative response model where qualitative data generated from responses to the questionnaire are used for the study. The sample size of 384 are drawn from the concerned respondents using sample size calculator developed Raosoft out of which 313 questionnaires are returned from both Badagry-Seme border, Lagos State and Owode-Idiroko, Ogun States which are purposively selected.

The study finds that, the presence of NCS at border communities have significantly decreased anti-smuggling activities when it condering controlling insecurity associated with banditry and robbery in the border communities in Southwestern Nigeria. Insecurity associated with banditry and robbery weaken anti-smuggling efforts of NCS but control of insecurity associated with money laundering and human trafficking significantly improves the anti-smuggling activities of NCS in the selected study areas.

The results of the data analysis reveals that NCS is complicit when discharging its role of controlling banditry and robbery at the border communities in Southwestern border areas. The study, also finds that NCS has highly contributed to the reduction of smuggling activities when considering insecurity associated with money laundering and human trafficking at the border communities.

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